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1 Introduction
The idea that other’s expectations are at the heart of conceptions of fairness can shed light
on some of the “paradoxes” of empirical moral philosophy. Consider the classic moral thought
experiment where you have the choice whether to pull a lever and divert an out-of-control
train careening towards a group of people, but at the cost of killing a strictly smaller number
of people standing on the other track: many people find it acceptable to pull the lever —
but in a related scenario, few people find it acceptable to push a portly companion into the
train’s path even if it has strictly better utilitarian outcomes.
One difference between the train diversion and the shove is about expectations. The
reason we find it morally acceptable to divert the train is that at the moment when we realize
the danger, our expectations for either group now include a high probability of death, with
the exact group in danger being a hidden move by nature. We find it objectionable to push
the man because the new train danger did not change the expectations for the portly man
whose expectation of death did not rise unless there was some unforeseen, purposeful action
by another person to put him at risk. The human agency involved in increasing the portly
man’s risks when he was “spared” by nature seems deeply unfair.
If we stay with the train example for a moment, suppose the larger group was warned
to stay off the tracks, were drunk, were trespassing etc., while the victims of the deserted
trains were authorized to be on the tracks and were conducting repairs? As we contextualize
the problem, our mental calculations about what other people should reasonably expect to
happen to them changes and problems that were formally cast as utilitarian, outcome based
moral decisions become process-oriented discussions of desert.
Extensive experimental research shows that individuals making decisions, at least in
a laboratory context, are not strictly concerned with their own consumption. Departures
from purely self-interested behavior, such as donations in public goods games and offers and
rejections in ultimatum games are common-place in the laboratory. While it is clear that
“social preferences” exist, it is not clear where these preferences come from, how stable they
are, how they are distributed among the population or even how they should be modeled.
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A large collection of experimental findings in economics has been attributed to per-
ceptions of fairness. However, as Camerer (2003) points out, a weakness of fairness-based
explanations is that they typically don’t address the question of where fairness preferences
might come from. One possibility is social conditioning. Roth et al. (1991) attribute to
cultural differences the small, significant differences found between Tokyo, Pittsburgh, and
Jerusalem in economic games. Roth (1995) specifies that differences in what is perceived as
“fair” or “expected” could explain differences found between American and Israeli proposers
in bargaining games. More broadly, Henrich (2000) and Henrich et al. (2001) suggest that
economic decisions and reasoning may be heavily influenced by cultural differences, defined
as the socially transmitted rules about how to behave. It has been argued that economic
theory needs to integrate cultural or moral forces to explain empirical findings.
Even the simplest experimental games designed to analyze social preferences in the
laboratory generate complex behavior that cannot be parsimoniously explained by a single,
simple model (Charness and Rabin 2002). In experiments, subjects have shown a willingness
to punish free-riders, reduce inequality, increase efficiency and enforce social norms, often
at substantial cost to themselves. Despite these regularities, there is a non-trivial share of
subjects who play laboratory games according to the selfish, homo economicus predictions.
To account for these heterogeneous outcomes, previous models of fairness have pro-
posed that some humans are “hard-wired” for reciprocity, inequity aversion, efficiency or
other kinds of behavior while others lack other-regarding preferences. Although these model-
ing approaches lead to simple, tractable models, they seem insufficiently rich to capture the
complexity of human behavior. Rather than assume a particular kind of preference, this pa-
per proposes that most social preferences can be understood as manifestations of a more basic
human taste for desert — the moral-philosophical notion that people should get what they
deserve and further, that for self-interested reasons, humans generally try to satisfy others’
expectations about what they deserve, which can be called a preference for placation.
A preference for placation is related to guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg
2007): the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm or distress on the re-
cipient. For example, in the dictator game, if the game partner expects to receive a certain
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amount, behaving selfishly causes feelings of guilt due to not fulfilling the partner’s expecta-
tions (Battigalli et al. 2013). This definition of guilt is motivated by psychological research
looking at a social relationship to a partner (Baumeister et al. 1994). See also Geanakoplos
et al. (1989) on incorporating the fulfillment of other’s beliefs into a social game. In contrast,
a preference for desert is related to notions of distributive justice, which could but does
not necessarily include others’ expectations (Elizabeth Hoffman 1985; Konow 2000; Gill and
Stone 2010; Adams 1966; Rabin 1998).
Desert and placation preferences can explain heterogeneous behavior across different
contexts without appealing to the notion of different “types” of people; different outcomes can
be traced to different beliefs about how people should play a certain game and accordingly,
what they expect from the game.1 This flexibility might seem to create a vacuous, tautological
theory since it is difficult to imagine how one can determine expectations, or even more
troubling, beliefs about other’s expectations. While it is true that determining expectations
is problematic, we can exogenously manipulate expectations by providing new information
and then observing whether or not individuals respond in the predicted direction. Further,
given the role that social norms play in regulating human behavior through social interactions
and the obvious cross-cultural pliability of those norms, it seems that a level of generality and
abstraction is needed for the model to organize disparate observations. Much like Koszegi
and Rabin (2006), I posit a reference-dependent kind of utility but remain agnostic about
how these reference points are formed.
I propose a reference-point dependent model of social behavior where individuals
maximize a three-term utility function: a consumption utility term and two “social” terms.
One social term captures a preference for desert (others getting what we think they deserve)
and the other term a preference for the satisfaction of other’s expectations, or to placate them
(i.e. them getting what we think they think they deserve). After motivating the modeling
assumptions with findings from empirical moral philosophy and evolutionary psychology, I
introduce the model and generate some simple comparative statics results, which I then test
1To be sure, one might be open to having both different types and different expectations and leave it as an
empirical question whether heterogeneity in behavior comes from different types or different expectations.
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with experiments using MTurk.
My model is closest to a recent paper by Smith and Wilson (2015), which argues that
the need for acceptance in one’s group drives behavior previously interpreted as inequity
aversion. Smith and Wilson (2015) quote Adam Smith, who believed that an individual
makes moral judgments on the propriety of own and other action given the context, but over
time the normative rules of propriety change by group consent.
“Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place,
without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character,
of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of
his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. . . Bring him into society, and
he is immediately provided with the mirror he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance
and behavior of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they
disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of
his passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind.”
Smith and Wilson (2015) further quote Adam Smith, who said that “Man has a ’love of
praise and of praise-worthiness’ and a ’dread of blame and blameworthiness’, and ’[t]he love
of praise-worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. . . .though they
resemble one another. . . [and]. . . are connected. . . , [they] are yet, in many respects, distinct
and independent of one another’ (Smith 1761).” Moral blame and blameworthiness is like a
preference for desert (others getting what we think they deserve). Moral praise and praise-
worthiness is like a preference for the satisfaction of other’s expectations, or to placate them
(i.e. them getting what we think they think they deserve).
Smith and Wilson (2015) proposes an additive interaction model of choice determined
by whether an action deserves social praise, whether it is praise-worthy, or both. A multi-stage
experiment is used to illustrate principles of fairness. Smith and Wilson (2015) distinguishes
from the prior literature on other-regarding behavior defined over own and other’s reward
payoffs by stating “when a key prediction of a theory fails, all of its assumptions must be on
the table for reconsideration, and the search for a resolution must not exclude consideration of
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entirely different ways of thinking, representing, and modeling the phenomena.” My approach
takes a middle ground. It builds on the assumptions of other-regarding behavior defined over
own and other’s reward payoffs, yet it distinguishes from Smith and Wilson (2015) by paying
formal attention to reference points in the model and an experiment that exogenously and
saliently shifts reference points.
2 Background
Recent work in experimental moral psychology by Greene et al. (2004) highlights the
two distinct ways in which humans react to moral dilemmas. The work focuses on the dis-
tinction people make between “personal” moral dilemmas that involve an individual causing
direct bodily harm to another through their own agency and “impersonal” moral dilemmas
that require abstract, utilitarian style reasoning. My model does not involve bodily harm,
but it is motivated by the same insight, which is that there is duality in our moral reasoning
that can be traced back to evolutionary features of the mind:
“Evidence from observations of great apes suggests that our common ancestors lived intensely
social lives guided by emotions such as empathy, anger, gratitude, jealousy, joy, love and a sense
of fairness, and all in the apparent absence of moral reasoning. Thus, from an evolutionary stand-
point, it would seem strange if human behavior were not driven in part by domain-specific social-
emotional dispositions. At the same time, however, humans appear to possess a domain-general
capacity for sophisticated abstract reasoning, and it would be surprising as well if this capacity
played no role in human moral judgement.” (Greene et al., 2004)
Ethologists studying social animals have found that dominance hierarchies are widespread,
with those at the top of the hierarchy receiving more food and more resources. One possible
evolutionary advantage of the dominance hierarchy is that it makes all animals’ reasonable
expectations publicly known and prevents socially destructive fighting over each new resource
distribution problem that arises. The basic idea is quite simple: we may treat people fairly
because we do not want to anger them, and since individuals are “prospectors,” we must
learn about their expectations and not just their levels of consumption in order to avoid
their wrath. In the animal world, there is considerable evidence that fighting among social
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animals occurs where expectations (such as who should get some piece of food) are unclear:
“Baboons ordinarily forage like flocks of birds, fanning out in a search for small vegetable items
that are picked off the ground and eaten quickly. The troop members seldom challenge each one
another under these circumstances. But when a clump of grass shoots is discovered in elephant
dung, or a small animal is killed, the baboons threaten one another and may even fight over the
food.”2
This example also suggests that in circumstances where sharing or allowing others to get
what they deserve is costly and in terms of foregone consumption (e.g. small dead animals
or grass shoots), self-interest “wins” over the social preferences.
As a rough approximation, it seems the desert utility — the pleasure from seeing
others getting what they deserve, which might include efficient outcomes or even justified
punishment — is a higher order, more abstract feature of the mind, while placating util-
ity is a more basic, “low-level” feature of the mind since it has such obvious importance
for any social animal including our pre-reasoning ancestors.3 Given insights from prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and the insights from the sociology literature on com-
parison theory, formulating other-regarding preferences in terms of reference points seems
well motivated by the facts. Shaw et al. (2011) finding that combining incentives with social
comparisons was most effective in incentivizing individuals in a field experiment is consistent
with the relevance of reference points.
Existing models of fairness can be roughly classified by how they treat intentions.
2Sociobiology, Wilson (2000), p249.
3We might also divide this between Type I thinking (also referred to as automatic, cognitive, unconscious)
or Type II thinking (reflective, motivational, conscious) (Kahneman 2011). A large collection of findings
on the malleability of moral reasoning by judges has been documented in U.S. federal circuit judges (Chen
2017b; Chen et al. 2016), federal district judges (Chen 2017a; Barry et al. 2016), immigration judges (Chen
et al. 2016), sentencing judges (Chen and Prescott 2016), and juvenile judges (Eren and Mocan 2016). Some
of these findings can be attributed to snap judgments whether from analysis of the first three seconds of
oral arguments (Chen et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2017) or from early predictability of judicial decisions based
on race or nationality (Chen et al. 2016; Chen and Eagel 2016). One way to model differences in judges’
decision-making is through shifts in their reference points about what is the just and fair decision given the
circumstances. These reference points may shift consciously or unconsciously. In most of these examples,
the desert term matters mostly for a just and fair decision, but in some cases, like asylum decisions, the
defendant reference points may play a role. More broadly, when individuals feel they are not being treated
justly or fairly, the perceived legitimacy of legal institutions is affected (Chen 2017c).
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Models of fairness that do not include intentions, such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) cannot explain experimental evidence that shows the importance
of motives behind subjective assessments of fairness (Falk et al. 2008). Models that do
include intentions (Rabin 1993; Falk and Fischbacher 2006) cannot explain the substantial
evidence that people will bear costs to punish others when they have no direct stake or were
not harmed directly. For example, third-parties will enforce social norms about sharing or
fairness even if it is costly for them to do so (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) and evidence from
neuro-economics suggests that enforcing social norms gives people some kind of pleasure,
or at the very least, not enforcing social norms causes displeasure (Spitzer et al. 2007). In
addition to a substantial body of experimental economics documenting social preferences,
some experiments have focused directly on desert: Eckel and Grossman (1996) conducted an
anonymous dictator-game experiment that showed distributions by the dictator became less
selfish as the target was seen as more deserving.
The great advantage of a reference-dependent fairness model is that it can accommo-
date the diversity of human behavior in different contexts as different beliefs about reference
points without partitioning people as “types” as is done in intention-free models of fairness
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or assuming aversion to particular distributions of outcomes. The
finding that, for example, business majors and economics students play certain economic
games differently seem unlikely to be due to the different mental machinery of those indi-
viduals, but rather the context, including their knowledge of the “rational” way to play the
game changes their beliefs about what is deserved.4 A process of updating expectations and
reference points during play can parsimoniously explain the findings of Camerer and Fehr
(2006) that certain “types” can tip games toward the rational, Nash Equilibrium predictions
or the cooperative predictions and provide a mechanism.
In my model of fairness with three components, the consumption-based utility term
is a standard economic utility function with the usual properties, the desert-utility function
is concave and only reaches a maximum when the other person gets what they “deserve,” and
4Similarly, the findings that judges decide cases differently and sentence more harshly after economics training
can be due to shifts in expectations (Ash et al. 2016).
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the backlash-aversion / social capital investment function is the target person’s prospect-
theory derived value function, centered at the target’s subjective reference point. The cost of
introducing a reference-dependent theory is complexity and the inability to make predictions
without some level of knowledge about the particular context in which behavior is occurring.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006), in their model of individual reference-dependent utilities, notes
that knowing expectations is difficult in the case of one person — adding another dimension
in which one person’s beliefs about other’s expectations (and their beliefs about the other’s
beliefs) certainly does not make things simpler. However, simple and wrong is no virtue and
it seems that existing simple models cannot account for all the readily apparent stylized facts
generated from even the most basic social interactions.
In Eckel and Grossman (1996), distributions by the dictator were affected by whether
the target was seen as more deserving. What is novel is fitting this taste for desert into a
framework sufficiently flexible to allow selfish behavior, altruism, reciprocity and even spiteful
behavior. This can be accomplished by assuming the better angel of wanting to see justice
served does not always win, but rather is one consideration, with the other considerations
being one’s own consumption and the possibility that the other person might retaliate or
help you in the future, depending upon whether your actions fell below or above their own
subjective expectation. In this paper, I model concern for how the other person will react to
some action in terms of a Prospect Theory-derived value function (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). If humans perceive angering others (whose anger or happiness is reference dependent)
has a real cost, then we would expect social preferences to consider the expectations of other
social actors.
It is obviously not possible to directly observe the evolutionary environment that
shaped human reasoning and therefore it is speculative to appeal to evolutionary forces to
explain some phenomena. The lack of observability of the ancestral environment or even a
fossil record of the evolution of “mental organs” threatens to turn any evolutionary explana-
tion for some feature of the human mind into a “just so” story. However, it is useful to think
about the contours of the evolutionary environment and consider some possible reasons why
our social mental machinery takes the form that it does.
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If loss-aversion or more generally, reference-dependent utilities are a fundamental
feature of the primate mind (Chen et al. 2006), it seems probable that the evolution of
the human mind — particularly the mental machinery for acting in social situations —
was shaped by this fact. Since reference points determine whether our social actions are
perceived as gifts, or affronts and these judgements could have consequences relevant to our
own well-being, it stands to reason that assessing other’s true reference points was adaptive.
Whether an action is interpreted as an affront or a gift will depend, in part, on
the skill with which we can estimate the other person’s true, subjective expectation from
some social situation and adjust our behavior accordingly. For example, judges are more
lenient when sentencing defendants on their birthday (Chen and Philippe 2017), and this
would be interpreted as a gift by the defendant who does not expect the judge to be lenient
due to societal expectations of being gentle on someone’s birthday.5 We are probably also
cognizant of the fact that individuals might benefit from over-stating their expectations
(and, since self-delusion is probably the best way to present a realistic portrayal of over-
inflated expectations, believing their inflated sense of what they deserve, we almost certainly
do not take others’ self-statements of expectations at face value, but rather make our own
assessments of what is fair. Both to prevent ourselves from being cheated or inadvertently
angering others or inadvertently giving too generous a gift, it was probably adaptive for our
ancestors to develop the ability to quickly assess a social situation and determine what each
person deserves and what each person was expecting.
Why should we care what others subjectively feel about a transfer, especially if we
have some true altruistic motive (in which case their actual material well-being is important
while their subjective, frame-dependent perception is irrelevant)? The answer is that an
aggrieved party might retaliate with violence and future non-cooperation. If fear of retaliation
5I use expectation or reference point in a very general sense and not in the strict mathematical sense; an
expectation might mean that the other person follows a certain custom or norm. Outside the lab, conceptions
of human rights may also hinge on the context, for example, on rights pertaining to asymmetric virginity
premiums (Chen 2005) or sexual harassment (Chen and Sethi 2016) or for repugnance norms related to
right of free speech (Chen 2015a) and abortion (Chen et al. 2017). The malleability of injunctive norms to
formal institutions such as the law (Chen and Yeh 2016, 2014) or markets (Chen 2015b; Chen and Lind
2016; Chen 2016) is suggestive of the relevance of reference points, but it’s hard to know, since many other
things change at the same time as formal institutions. This paper shares the experimental approach to
measure normative commitments (Chen et al. 2016; Shaw et al. 2011).
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can explain other-regarding preferences, why do we need a separate taste for desert? Perhaps
the strongest reason is that social behavior is clearly not governed solely by a concern for
other’s ability to help or hurt us. As noted before, efforts are made to punish free-riders,
enforce social norms and promote other social goods like efficiency. Aside from the evidence
that requires explanation, another motivation for desert preferences is that humans do seem
to incorporate “higher-order,” social concerns into their thinking and genuinely suffer a real
psychic cost when they see what they perceive as valuable social norms violated, regardless of
whether the situation directly impinges upon their narrowly-defined welfare. The relevance
of non-consequentialist motivations, such as duty has been suggested in some experiments.6
Another answer is that a model needs a taste for desert because it is an empirical
regularity. Third-parties will spend resources to punish others, even if the person has done
nothing to them (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). If our only concern was our own consumption
and possibility of reprisal, it would never be optimal to punish someone and further, we would
never show compassion for those too weak to hurt us or help us — and yet we do, albeit
perhaps not as much, ceteris paribus, as the regard we show to those who are more useful
to us. Even in simple ultimatum games, without a taste for desert, we cannot explain the
rejection of low-offers without assuming some kind of expectation for repeated interactions
or, as some have done, a taste for equity. A second reason is that so long as the consumption
rewards of defection are not so great, a taste for desert can immediately generate the tit-
for-tat strategy without having to assume a special kind of taste for reciprocity (Axelrod
and Hamilton 1981). In a repeated game, a person with a taste for desert will respond to a
defection with defection in order to bring the defector back to their proper reference point,
but once this is done, is once again interested in cooperation.
3 Model
The dictator game has the same relationship to the investigation of social preferences
that the fruit fly does to the study of genetics. It is perhaps the simplest possible interaction
6 For an economic model and test of the categorical imperative, see Chen and Schonger (2016; 2017).
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that has a by-design social preference / fairness component. A decision-maker might be a
judge or prosecutor who has to determine what is the fair sentencing decision or sentence
to charge. Being too harsh or too lenient, from their perspective, is undesirable, while, a
defendant experience gains with sentencing leniency.
Since this paper’s intention is not to propose a general model for all social interactions,
I present a utility function specific to the dictator game. This formulation can serve as the
building block for more complicated analysis, such as public goods games, ultimatum games,
etc. This game is simple, deterministic and it is easy to specify expectation beliefs (unlike
in more complicated settings where expectations might include certain actions or following
more complex social norms than simply sharing some quantity of resources). Suppose there
are two individuals playing a dictator game, Gabriel the giver and Randy the recipient.
Gabriel has to decide the optimal transfer x ∈ [0, w] to give to Randy. Gabriel’s utility from
making a transfer is given by equation 1.
Proposer’s utility from making a transfer is given by Equation 1.
(1) Ug(x) = u(w − x) + up(x− xRPp ) + vr(x− xRPr )
Where w is her initial wealth, xRPp is her subjective reference point of what is the just transfer
in this situation and xRPr is her best estimate or belief about what the Receiver’s reference
point is for the game. Gabriel’s belief about what Randy deserves (i.e. her belief about his
reference point), irrespective of the costs that would be incurred in actually making this
transfer, is captured by xRPp . Randy’s actual beliefs about what he deserves are xRPr .
The model assumptions are:
• The consumption utility term is increasing and is strictly concave: u′() > 0, u′′() ≤ 0
• The desert utility function is concave and is maximized at the desert point: xRPp =
argmaxxup(x, x
RP
p )
• The vr() function is concave in gains and is zero when the Receiver receives exactly
what Proposer believes he believes he should receive: vr(xRPr ) = 0
• If x > xRPr , then vr(x− xRPr ) > 0 and v′′r () ≤ 0, otherwise vr(x− xRPr ) ≤ 0, v′′r () ≥ 0.
12
These assumptions generate some very simple comparative statics results, which are pre-
sented below and then tested. For ease of notation, let xRPr = xr and xRPp = xp. For intuition,
let each second-derivative be negative so that u′′(w − x∗) + u′′p(x∗ − xp) + v′′r (x∗ − xr) < 0.
After the basic results are presented with a figure, this assumption is relaxed and discussed.
Lemma 1: The optimal transfer x∗ is strictly increasing in what the Proposer believes
the Receiver deserves, or: δx∗/δxp > 0.
Proof. The first-order condition for the Proposer’s maximization problem is
−u′(w − x) + u′p(x− xp) + v′r(x− xr) = 0
This first-order condition defines an implicit relationship between the optimal transfer x∗
and the two exogenous reference points: x∗ = x∗(xp, xr). Differentiating with respect to
the Proposer’s reference point xp, with x∗p(xp, xr) representing the partial derivative of the
optimal transfer with respect to xp.
u′′(w − x∗)x∗p(xp, xr) + u′′p(x∗ − xp)(x∗p(xp, xr)− 1) + v′′r (x∗ − xr)x∗p(xp, xr) = 0
Solving, yields:
x∗p(xp, xr) =
u′′p(x
∗ − xp)
u′′(w − x∗) + u′′p(x∗ − xp) + v′′r (x∗ − xr)
If the second derivative of all of the three terms have a negative sum (u′′(w− x∗) + u′′p(x∗ −
xp) + v
′′
r (x
∗ − xr) < 0), then x∗p(xp, xr) ≥ 0, regardless of the particular value of x∗.
Lemma 2: The optimal transfer x∗ is strictly increasing in what the Proposer believes
the Receiver believes he deserves, or: δx∗/δxr > 0.
Proof. Following the same procedure in the proof of the first lemma,
x∗r(xp, xr) =
v′′r (x
∗ − xp)
u′′(w − x∗) + u′′p(x∗ − xp) + v′′r (x∗ − xr)
and thus x∗r(xp, xr) ≥ 0, regardless of the particular value of x∗.
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These lemmas are illustrated in the accompanying figure.
The figure shows that the Receiver is loss averse relative to his reference point. If
x < xRPr , then vr(x− xRPr ) ≤ 0, v′′r () ≥ 0, and the proof is slightly more complicated.
Loss-Averse Receiver:
If the second derivative of vr() is positive enough, then u′′(w−x∗)+u′′p(x∗−xp)+v′′r (x∗−
xr) > 0 can lead to the opposite conclusion for Lemma 1. The intuition can be illustrated by
supposing the Proposer is in the lower-left quadrant of the figure (“Sharing Isn’t So Bad”), and
has made a decision at the Recipient’s reference point. Now, the optimal decision can decrease
as the Recipient’s reference point increases. This is because the Proposer has a concave cost
of deviating from the optimal decision. As the Recipient’s reference point increases and vr()
shifts rightward, the Proposer may decide “what-the-hell” and jump to a lower optimum (in
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the upper-right quadrant of the figure) rather than placate the Recipient. This is consistent
with situations when the Recipient asks or expects too much, leading the Proposer to ignore
his expectations. In the figure, the marginal cost of meeting the Recipient’s expectations
increases with pressure from the desert and consumption utility terms.
Popular terms like the “What the Hell Effect” (Ariely 2012; Baumeister and Heather-
ton 1996) capture this behavioral tendency—the cognitive cost of deviating downwards in
a large scale is not much larger than in a small scale. A number of theoretical papers show
that the curvature of bliss-point deviations has important implications for decision making
in social and political settings. For instance, as discussed by Osborne (1995) and shown
by Kamada and Kojima (2014), concavity drives polarization in political platforms. This
is since voters do not perceive a difference between a policy slightly away from their bliss
point and a policy far away. Hence, unless a candidate adheres very closely to a group of
voters’ preferences, these voters will not vote at all, implying that in a polarized electorate
political platforms will be polarized when ideological costs are concave but not otherwise. In
a different setting, Chen et al. (2016) shows that concavity in deviating from a bliss point
can lead judges to cave-in – dissent less often – than other judges despite having the least
say in shaping court decisions.
In Lemma 2, if the Proposer’s reference point decreases, the optimal decision may
jump to a lower optimum. This is because the numerator, v′′r () ≥ 0, so if the Receiver is loss
averse enough and u′′(w−x∗)+u′′p(x∗−xp)+v′′r (x∗−xr) > 0, the original prediction holds. The
intuition can be seen in the lower-left quadrant of the figure. As the Proposer’s reference point
decreases and up(x, xRPp ) shifts leftward, the Proposer’s utility at xRPr decreases more sharply
than the utility for some decision less than xRPr . That is, the marginal cost of meeting the
Recipient’s expectations increases with pressure from the desert term. Thus, if the Recipient
is sufficiently loss averse, decreasing the reference point of the Proposer leads the Proposer
to decide “what-the-hell” and jump to a lower optimum.
Example:
An application of the model is that we might score judges on their indifference to
others. One way to know if a judge is indifferent, is by observing where behavioral biases
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arise. Psychologists find many effects of moderate sizes in the lab, so settings where people
are closer to indifference among options are more likely to lead to detectable effects outside
of it. The flatter is the judge’s parabola (in the figure), the more sensitive the judge is to
behavioral biases. Another way to put it is that the judge becomes less predictable.
4 Experimental Design & Results
To test the comparative static results, I use a contextualized dictator game and a
contextualized gift game in an MTurk experiment. Subjects were recruited from an on-
line temporary work environment that allows users of the website to complete simple tasks
proposed by others in exchange for payment. In this real market, workers perform tasks
that are generally hard for computers but easy for humans. Common tasks include image
tagging (i.e. writing captions for images), categorizing websites by their context, transcribing
audio files to text, transcribing badly scanned text documents or extracting particular pieces
of information from scanned documents. In the experiments, I presented a task in which
subjects were asked to rate the work of another worker. Using other workers to check the
work of others is a very common task on the website.
The experimental task was a real-work task (though not very taxing): subjects were
shown a scanned image of text and the transcription work of “another worker.” Subjects were
asked to compare the scanned image to the transcription and then complete some additional
task, depending on the particular experiment. In the pure gift games, subjects were asked to
assess a penalty or bonus for the work, while in the dictator games, subjects were asked to
split a bonus with the original “worker.” On the website, awarding bonuses for good work is
commonplace, as is using multiple workers to check the work of each other, so it is unlikely
that any worker found the experiments unusual or artificial.
Although de-contextualized experiments have been the norm is experimental eco-
nomics, it is possible that typical laboratory scenarios never really strip away context and
create a “pure” testing environment; many experimental protocols can evoke a very specific
context with well-developed norms, namely that of a true, competitive game.7 While having
7If your mother-in-law lands on “Boardwalk” when playing Monopoly, you will charge her the full price; when
she comes to visit and stays at your guest-bedroom, she probably will not be billed.
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a context certainly does not make these experiments better than laboratory experiments,
it also does not seem like a handicap, especially since the experiment was in a real work
environment with subjects unaware that they were participating in an experiment. Further,
subjects were randomly assigned to treatment and control upon accepting the work and
subjects can not interact with each other in anyway.
To recruit subjects, I placed tasks on the site and advertised $0.12 - $0.15 for com-
pleting the task.8 Once workers accepted, they would click on a link that would re-direct
them to a script that randomly assigned subjects to treatment groups (basically by using a
series of if-then statements with URL re-directs). The study was conducted on April 2, 2009.
To give a sense of the stakes, in experiments involving data entry of the text image
(Chen 2016; Chen and Horton 2016), a paragraph takes about 100 seconds to enter so a
payment of $0.10 per paragraph is equivalent to $86.40 per day. The current federal minimum
wage in the Unites States is $58/day. In India, payment rate depends on the type of work
done, although the "floor" for data entry positions appears to be about $6.38/day.9 Most
of the subjects came from the U.S. or India (I conducted pooled analysis throughout). In
other studies conducted by the author using this data entry task, subjects did seriously enter
the text image. In one study, one worker emailed saying that $0.10 was too high and that
the typical payment for this sort of data entry was $0.03 cents per paragraph. The decision-
task involves reading (not transcribing) a single paragraph and making 1 decision, with an
additional bonus possible. For instance, $0.30 is the maximum a subject could obtain and is
up to 10 times the expected wage.
5 Placation: Manipulate Receiver Reference Point xRPr
Lemma 2 predicts that the proposer’s transfer will increase if the proposer believes
that the receiver has a higher reference point. In this experiment, subjects were randomized
into two groups. In one group, subjects were told that performing a transcription received a
8Prices varied across experiments but not within experiments since some tasks are more onerous than others
and therefore would require a higher payment to attract subjects. While there is non-random selection
into the experiment (which is the case with all experiments), there was still random assignment into the
treatment groups.
9Payscale, Salary Snapshot for Data Entry Operator Jobs, http://www.payscale.com/research/IN/Job=Data_Entry-
_Operator/Salary?, accessed June 17, 2011.
17
base payment of $0.25 but that they were eligible for a $0.05 bonus, a $0.05 penalty or they
could be kept at the status quo of $0.25. Here, 11 subjects awarded $0.25, 6 awarded $0.20,
and 8 awarded $0.30. In the second group, subjects were told that the base rate was $0.30
and that they could assess a $0.05 penalty or a $0.10 penalty or keep the status quo. In this
treatment, 15 subjects chose to award $0.30, 11 awarded $0.25, and 1 awarded $0.20. Note
that in both groups, the possible outcomes for the worker are the same: x = {20, 25, 30}.
Figure 1a plots the effect that the reference point had on transfers. Table 1 reports the results
of a means comparison test of transfers in the two groups. It can reject the null-hypothesis
of invariance to reference-points (p < 0.05).
6 Desert: Manipulate Proposer Reference Point xRPp
In both groups, subjects inspect the transcription work, which they can compare
to the scanned image of the work pasted directly above the text box containing the work.
The transcription sentences are numbered and subjects are asked to check a box indicating
whether or not the line contained an error. After assessing the work, subjects are asked to
split a $0.15 bonus between themselves and the other worker in $0.05 increments. To ensure
there was more variation in outcomes, the 50-50 split option was not present. This also
encourages subjects to think harder about their splitting decision in light of their task with
error-checking. Figure 1b shows the distribution of transfers for each group. In the treatment
group with no errors, 2 subjects transferred $0.00 to themselves, 19 transferred $0.05 to
themselves, 5 transferred $0.10 to themselves, and 1 transferred all $0.15 to themselves. In
the treatment group with multiple errors, 0 subjects transferred $0.00 to themselves, 19
transferred $0.05 to themselves, 11 transferred $0.10 to themselves, and 2 transferred $0.15
to themselves.
Comparing group means, we see in Table 2 that the group with the higher number
of errors does have a higher average self-transfer (p < 0.1). Table 3 shows that the number
of errors found by the subjects is highly correlated with the number of true latent errors
in the treatment and control transcriptions (p < 0.001). Table 4 shows that the amount of
money subjects transferred to themselves is strongly correlated with number of errors found
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(p < 0.001) but not with any other subject characteristics.
One criticism is that the number of errors might be endogenous, with cognitively-
impaired people missing errors or greedy people inflating the number of errors to justify
taking more. To control for this possibility, Table 5 includes a regressor for the number
of wrong answers (the difference between the true number of errors and the number they
reported). The table shows that the number of incorrectly identified mistakes (the coefficient
on “wrong”) does not have an effect on transfers: in other words, it does not appear that
subjects were artificially inflating the number of mistakes to justify a greater transfer.
One feature that is interesting is that assessing the high-error work requires only a
marginally greater amount of work but leads to a significant decrease in bonuses. It does not
seem likely that subjects feel that they deserve more for having to examine the error-filled
work (they are not asked to correct the work or even identify precisely what the errors are).
It is far more likely that they perceive the worker making many errors undeserving of a full
bonus and are willing to benefit from the situation, but they are unwilling to extract the full
bonus when they perceive the worker as having done perfect work (in fact, not one worker
took the full bonus in the perfect transcription group).
7 Penalty vs. Bonus Framing Effects
One possible concern with experiments that require subjects to assign penalties vs.
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bonuses is that, even without a reference-point model, subjects might view penalties and
bonuses as fundamentally different. To an extent, the meanings of the words penalties and
bonuses creates a frame, though they both imply some action that was unexpected.
In a third experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to two groups: in the first
group, subjects were asked to assess transcription work and assign a penalty, while in the
second group, subjects were asked to assess a bonus between $0.00 and $0.10. Both groups
examined the same transcription. The transcription had two errors — “principals” was spelled
“principalss’ and “decision” is spelled “dicision.” Other than these errors, the transcription
is accurate. In one group, subjects were asked to assess a penalty between $0.00 and $0.10,
while in the other, subjects were asked to assess a bonus between $0.00 and $0.10. Critically,
subjects were not informed about the base rate at which the worker was paid and thus was
not supplied any information with which to infer the hypothetical worker’s reference point.10
The original hypothesis was that subjects would be more averse to imposing penalties
than to withholding a bonus for poor performance. The data did not, however, bear out this
hypothesis. Figure 1c is a histogram of the implied “transfer” i.e. the bonus b or the portion of
10To be sure, the action space and range is slightly different from the second experiment.
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the penalty not imposed, 10−p. In the bonus frame, there were 22 subjects and in the penalty
frame, there were 28 subjects. What is surprising about this plot is the consistency between
the two treatment groups. Both show a marked bi-modality, with most people awarding
the maximum transfer and some awarding only a small transfer with very few splitting the
difference with payments of 4, 5, or 6.
Although these results are tangential to the theory, they do speak to the inadequacy
of assuming that a) people are unconditionally altruistic when they have no stake (why not
give the full bonus?) and that b) aversion to putting others below their expectations is not the
only factor considered by subjects (if subjects believed that workers had high expectations,
then they wouldn’t risk not giving full bonuses).
One interpretation for the consistency between the treatment groups is that since the
subject can observe the task and the response, the subject can determine the optimal base
rate the employer and the hypothetical worker would have signed, with beliefs about the
world “filling in” the appropriate level of quality then imputes the contractual arrangement
that would have been made. Suppose for example that the average belief about what the
worker deserved is $0.25 compared to $0.30 for a perfect transcription. In the penalty group,
subjects observe the punishment possibilities [0, 10] and assume a contract was written for
30 cents, with the expectation of penalties and therefore, they feel no qualms about assessing
a $0.05 penalty. In contrast, the bonus group has the same beliefs but assumes that the base
contract was $0.20 with the expectation of a bonus between [0, 10], with $0.10 for perfect
work. In this group, they assess a bonus of 5 cents to bring the worker to their “deserved”
wage.
8 Subject Motivation
If subjects have social preferences and presumably have some prior belief about
Freddy’s marginal utility of money and the experimenter’s marginal utility of money, any
reasonable belief about the general financial situation of requesters and turkers would call
for a strong turker-bias. If it is weakly more pleasant to award bonuses than exact penalties,
especially when costs to the subject are equal, and we assume that individuals are not sadists
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nor prone to random clicking, why isn’t the full transfer made in every case?
Part of the story is certainly that subjects perceive of themselves as agents of the
principal (the experimenter). However, if the agent even weakly prefers paying bonuses to
enacting penalties, not paying a full transfer in the principal-agent context only makes sense
if they also perceive themselves as playing a repeated-game with the principal and that
somehow “incorrect” ratings will jeopardize a future relationship. While this repeated-games
interpretation is possible, the complete absence of promulgated standards in the task de-
scription, the advertisements exhorting speed and easiness (not careful consideration) and
the generally small stakes make this interpretation questionable.
It is possible that Mturkers are blindly punching keys and making mouse clicks to
avoid expending any effort at all, but it seems more likely that most workers are taking their
task at least somewhat seriously.
9 Conclusion
Tastes for desert and placation could explain results such as those found by Bohnet
and Zeckhauser (2004), which is that people are averse to getting betrayed and will demand
a premium for accepting a risk of betrayal above the risk premium that would require for
a risky lottery where nature makes the pay-off determination. It is perfectly reasonable if,
looking forward, a rational agent with a taste for desert knows that she will feel, ex post, an
obligation to punish the cheater if she is betrayed, and further, this punishment is especially
painful due to the loss-aversion of the target of the punishment. This observation is similar
to the anecdote related in Lazear et al. (2012) about someone who doesn’t like to share
but doesn’t want to not share might cross the street to avoid a beggar, a phenomenon that
Andreoni et al. (2012) examined in the field.
While not manipulated in these experiments, there is substantial empirical evidence
that social distance can affect behavior towards others (Hoffman et al. 1996, 1999; Bohnet
and Frey 1999). The authors cited disagree about the mechanism — i.e. whether individuals
are worried about retaliation or whether knowing the identity of one’s “victim” increases the
salience of what is wrong with stiffing the receiver in a social dictator game – but the model
here captures both effects.
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One seemingly counter-intuitive implication of the model is that we might actually
punish more harshly those people who are socially “close”. Judges sentence defendants more
harshly when they share the same first initial (Chen and Prescott 2016). Kenyan brokers
are more likely to defraud members of their own ethnic group (Yenkey 2015). The ratio of
murders by relatives to murders by strangers suggests that social distance is no guarantee of
strictly pleasant relationships.
While people in many cultures may consider themselves to have capacity for moral
judgment—and expect other people to agree with their moral judgments—they may dis-
agree about what constitutes the morally good thing to do in various circumstances. Such
disagreements take place both within and across cultures. Different individuals often have
different views on what they think is right or just, but where do these ideas come from? This
paper proposes that these ideas come from expectations of what is just and fair.
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